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degree of unification in the financial supervisory regime cannot be defined a priori; rather it is an 
expected variable, calculated by the policymakers that maintains or reform the financial 
architectures. Therefore in Section three the adopted approach is to consider the supervisory 
structure with one or more authorities as an endogenous variable, determined in turn by the 
dynamics of other structural variables, economic and institutional, that can summarize and explain 
the political delegation process. In order to construct an endogenous variable, in Section four it is 
introduced a Financial Authorities’ Concentration Index (FAC Index), to have an indicator of the 
degree of unification of powers. Then in Section five it is considered the nature of the institutions 
involved in the control responsibilities. In particular, we must ask what role the central bank plays 
in the various national institutional settings.  It is introduced an index of the central bank's 
involvement in financial supervision, the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA 
Index). Using both the FAC Index and the CBFA Index we shed light on the current trends in the 
financial supervision architecture. In Section six, to empirically gauge the possible determinants of 
the degree of concentration of powers, it is performed an econometric analysis of the Probit and 
Logit types. Section eight put forward some conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
2. Financial Supervision Architectures: The Traditional Approach 
 
From the conceptual point of view, our starting point is obviously the blurring effect6 that current 
developments in the banking and financial industry are having on supervisory issues7. Increasing 
integration has taken place between the banking, securities and insurance markets, as well as among 
the corresponding products and instruments. The blurring effect produces in particular two 
intertwined phenomena: the emergence of financial conglomerates8, that is likely to produce 
important changes in nature and dimensions of the single intermediaries, as well as in the degree of 
consolidation of the banking and financial industry ; the growth of the securitisation of traditional 
forms of banking activities and the proliferation of sophisticated ways of bundling, repackaging and 
trading risks, that weakened the classic distinction between equity, debt and loans 9, leading changes 
in nature and dimensions of the financial markets. 
 
The financial blurring process poses at least three questions in the debate on financial supervision 
structure10: sectoral (institutional) approach versus functional approach; single supervisor model 
versus multi-authorities model; and, particularly in the European Union, centralized setting versus 
decentralized setting11. 
 
It is a fact that, in the perspective of increasing financial integration, the relevance of the first 
question has been rapidly declining. Theoretically, the sectoral approach is based on the possibility 
of separating the banking, securities and insurance markets. The progressive erosion of market 
separation is likely to cause the "default" of the institutional approach12. Institutionally, the above 
                                                 
6 See the “classic” Corrigan (1987).  
7 See Dale (1997) and White (1997). 
8 See European Commission (2002) and de Luna Martinez and Rose (2003). 
9 de Luna Martinez and Rose (2003). 
10 See Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2002). 
11 The range of possible models for the structure of financial supervision at a national and a European level is identified 
by Kremers, Schoenmaker and Wierts (2001). 
12 For a deeper analysis see Masciandaro and Porta (2004).  See also Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2002) and Schoenmaker 
(2003). 
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hypothesis that the financial blurring trend favours the alternative functional supervisory approach 
is confirmed by the fact that various models (“pure” or “mixed”) of such a supervisory approach 
have been adopted recently or is currently under discussion in several countries13. 
 
From the other standpoint, particularly in the European context14, the centralized versus 
decentralized question seems to be 1) a second-stage problem, given that alternative solutions are 
likely to be strictly dependent on the various European national answers or positions on the optimal 
design of the financial supervisory framework, notwithstanding it has been rightly noted that the 
choice at the European level does not necessarily have to co-incide with the choices at the national 
level15,  2) closely linked to the answer to the single supervisor approach versus multi-authorities 
approach dilemma, 3) less urgent respect to the national dilemmas, given that while the blurring 
effect urges countries to choose their supervisory model, at the European level it can possible to 
wait for comparative data16 and experiences. 
 
Today, therefore, given the dominance of the functional approach and the "deferred" nature of the 
centralized-decentralized questions, the alternative between the financial single authority  
(integrated or unified) model and the financial multi - authorities model seem to be the more 
relevant one.  
 
Identifying the optimal supervisory regime between the two models is a truly interesting problem.  
Prima facie, from the theoretical point of view, the single supervisor model seems to be the 
"natural" and best answer to the challenges posed by the market-blurring and financial 
conglomerates phenomena17. If, in the long run, the expected financial structure is a perfect 
integrated and unique market, the best design for the supervisory architecture would seem to be the 
single authority18. Furthermore, also considering the institutional point of view, the success of the 
single supervisor model seems to be growing, particularly in the European area: the UK19, Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden20 have chosen to delegate financial supervision to a 
single authority21, as well as Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Hungary. But the answer is not so simple. 
 
A strand of recent literature22 pointed out that, given different institutional settings, it is possible to 
highlight the corresponding gains and losses23, and then to perform a rational cost-benefit analysis 
to choose between alternative models24.  
                                                 
13 See Section four. 
14 On the European financial regulation architecture debate see Schoenmaker (2003), Schuler (2003); see also Prati and 
Schinasi (1999),  Padoa Schioppa (1999), Vives (1999), European Commission (2000), Favero et al.(2000), European 
Central Bank (2001), Wise Men (2001), OECD (2001) and (2002), Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2002). In particular, for the 
European Financial Services Authority solution see Eijffinger (2001) and Vives (2001). 
15 Schoenmaker (2003). 
16 Schoenmaker (2003). 
17 See De Luna Martinez and Rose (2001). The importance of financial conglomerates in explaining the current 
regulators architecture reforms is claimed in Abrams and Taylor (2001),  Whalen (2001), Grunbichler and Darlap 
(2003), Schoenmaker (2003).  
18 See Lanoo (2000) and Briault (1999). 
19 See Briault and Gelter (1995), Norgren (1998), Briault (1999) 
20 See Taylor and Fleming (1999). 
21 See Lannoo (2000). 
22 See explicitly Hawkesby (2000), but most of the quoted studies seem to be consistent with the cost-benefit approach. 
23 For a complete analysis on the arguments in favor of and against integrated supervision see De Luna Martinez and 
Rose (2001).  
24 In the specific banking regulation area, Kahn and Santos (2001), provide a theoretical analysis of several alternative 
institutional allocations of regulations. 
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We agree with the initial intuition—the importance of the cost-benefit analysis25—but the relative 
conclusion  on the possibility to find an optimal supervisory regime seem to be rather unsatisfactory 
and inconclusive. First, one can say that, given a single authority, it is possible to increase the 
efficiency in the relationship between supervisor and regulated firms, because the cost of 
supervision and the possibility of supervisory arbitrage decrease26.  But one can also say that, given 
the single supervisor model, efficiency in the supervisor-regulated firm  relationships decreases 
because, with a single authority, the capture risks could increase27  as well as the innovations 
incentive in the regulated industry could decrease28 (Table 1). Therefore, the sign and the 
magnitude of the single supervisor model effects, with respect to the regulated firm relationship 
issues, seem rather vague and ambiguous. 
 
One can reach the same kind of conclusion by analyzing the relationship between the single 
authority and the political system (independence and accountability29, discretionality 30 or 
capture31?), the effects in terms of supervisory organization and resource allocation (economies32 or 
diseconomies of scale33, benefits or costs of goal conflicts’ internalization34?), and the 
consequences on the financial services costumers behaviour (confidence35 or over-confidence36?). 
 
Therefore it has been correctly claimed that there no exist a “superior” model of supervision37. In 
reality, the gains and losses of a supervisory model are expected variables, calculated by the agents 
(i.e. the policymakers) that maintains or reform the supervisory regime. But the expectations of 
policymakers, given their own specific goals, are likely to be influenced by structural economic and 
institutional variables, which may vary from country to country. Therefore the supervisory regime 
is not a given. On the contrary, given the national economic and institutional endowment, these 
variables can determine, ceteris paribus, the policymakers’ expected gains or losses of a specific 
supervisory regime. The supervisory regime becomes the endogenous variable. In other words, the 
optimal supervisory regime is a sort of path-dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 The prons and cons of the integrated model are analysed in Barth, Nolle, Phumiwasana and Yago (2002), Kremers, 
Schoenmaker and Wierts (2003),  
26 Briault (1999), Llewellyn (1999b), Goodhart (2002). 
27 Taylor (1995). 
28 Barth, Nolle, Phumiwasana and Yago (2002). 
29 Briault (1999), Llewellyn (1999b), Lannoo (2000), Abrams and Taylor (2001). On the meaning of regulatory and 
supervisory independence see Quintyn and Taylor (2002). Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) examine the impact 
of bank supervision independence on the corporate financing obstacles. 
30 Goodhart et al. (1998). See also Laslett and Taylor (1998),  Quintyn and Taylor (2002). On the risks of excessive 
power of  a single regulator see also Taylor (1995), Briault (1999), Llewellyn (1999b). 
31 Fender and Von Hagen (1998). 
32 Briault (1999) and (2002), Llewellyn (1999b), Lannoo (2000). Abrams and Taylor (2001) and Goodhart (2002) claim 
that the economies of scale argument is most applicable in small countries or those with small financial systems. 
Abrams and Taylor (2001) argue that the shortage of supervisory resources is a serious problem particularly in 
emerging market economies. 
33 Goodhart  et al. (1998). 
34 Briault (1999), Llewellyn (1999b), Lannoo (2000), Wall and Eisenbeis (2000). 
35 Llewellyn (1999b). 
36 Lannoo (2000). 
37 Briault (2002), Lumpkin (2002), Schoenmaker (2003). 
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TAB. 1 SINGLE AUTHORITY: TRADITIONAL COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
                                                         EXPECTED BENEFITS           EXPECTED COSTS 
AUTHORITY- 
REGULATED                                          SUPERVISION                             CAPTURE           
FIRMS                                                       COSTS      +                                   RISKS + 
RELATIONSHIPS                                     SUPERVISION                            INNOVATIONS 
                                                                    ARBITRAGE                               DISINCENTIVES 
 
 
AUTHORITY-                                       INDEPENDENCE                            CAPTURE 
POLITICAL                                            GAINS                                               RISKS 
SYSTEM 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
AUTHORITY                                         ECONOMIES                                DISECONOMIES 
INTERNAL                                             OF                                                  OF 
ORGANIZATION                                    SCALE                                          SCALE  
      
                                                                  GOAL                                           GOAL 
                                                                  CONFLICTS                                 CONFLICTS 
                                                                  INTERNALIZATION          INTERNALIZATION       
                                                                  BENEFITS                                       COSTS 
 
FINANCIAL                                             CONFIDENCE                       OVERCONFIDENCE 
SERVICES                                                BENEFITS                               COSTS 
COSTUMERS 
 
 
 
Having defined the theoretical framework of the endogenous supervisory regime, the following 
question is empirical: are there common cross-border economic and/or institutional structural 
variables that explain why a country chooses or rejects a given supervisory model?  
 
It is evident that, if a given supervisory regime is characterized by common economic and 
institutional endowments, the probability that this model will be adopted in a specific country, or in 
a specific area, will depend on the presence of these endowments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
